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“NON-CONVICTION” DNA DATABASES AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
LIZ CAMPBELL* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Common law countries share a growing receptiveness to the use of DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) in criminal investigation and prosecution, with the 
formalisation and steady expansion of schemes of DNA collection and 
retention.   Despite a general consensus regarding the significance and 
value of genetic material in criminal justice, there is considerable 
divergence in terms of the populations from whom DNA may be collected 
and the length of time for which DNA may be retained.   This article 
takes a comparative approach by assessing the trajectory of the law 
relating to DNA collection and retention in a range of common law 
jurisdictions, and ascertains how aspects of particular countries’ laws seek 
to resolve common problematic issues that arise concerning human rights, 
in particular the rights to bodily integrity, of privacy and the presumption 
of innocence.   It identifies a common international movement to a risk-
based approach and concludes that of the comparator jurisdictions the 
Canadian model provides the most fitting accommodation for human 
rights in DNA database expansion. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Legal systems across the Commonwealth and beyond share a growing 
receptiveness to the use of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in criminal 
investigation and prosecution, with the formalisation and steady 
expansion of schemes of DNA collection and retention.   Gathering 
genetic material from crime scenes and individuals and running 
checks against existing records entail numerous potential benefits in 
the crime control sense:  the ready and speedy identification of 
suspects, the exclusion of innocent and wrongly suspected parties 
from police focus, the exoneration of the wrongfully convicted, and 
the deterrence of some would-be criminal actors due to the increased 
chance of detection.   Moreover, on-going storage of genetic material 
permits speculative or “cold” searching which hastens investigations 
and may provide leads for hitherto unsolved crimes.   This 
contributes to a general consensus regarding the significance and 
value of genetic material in criminal investigations;  however, 
common law countries diverge considerably in terms of the 
populations from whom DNA may be acquired and the length of 
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time for which DNA may be retained.   Collecting DNA from 
convicted adults and storing it in state databases is seen now as a 
relatively uncontroversial and proportionate incursion on human 
rights, given that it is predicated on a finding of guilt, but policies and 
practices relating to children and to unconvicted persons are more 
contentious normatively speaking and thus far from settled in a legal 
sense.1  
This article takes a comparative approach in assessing the 
trajectory of the law relating to DNA collection and retention in a 
number of common law jurisdictions, and ascertains how aspects of 
particular laws seek to resolve common problematic issues that arise 
concerning human rights.   The focus here is on competent adults 
alone, rather than also including children which would necessitate 
consideration of issues regarding consent, bodily integrity, labelling 
and reintegration which are particularly pertinent and controversial 
regarding minors.2   In the context of unconvicted adults, the non-
consensual collection of genetic material encroaches on the right to 
bodily integrity especially, while the subsequent storage of DNA 
arguably affects the right to privacy as well as the presumption of 
innocence.   The expansion of laws regarding non-conviction3 DNA 
collection and retention in many jurisdictions may be explained by 
broad trends away from a rights-oriented paradigm towards a more 
populist and punitive model, by the emphasis in political discourse 
and practice on the need to avert risk, and the desire to “rebalance” 
the criminal justice system in favour of the victim and the wider 
community.   However, the competing demands that relate to 
criminal justice have been resolved differently when it comes to DNA 
collection and retention, thereby rendering some countries’ schemes 
more problematic in terms of human rights than others. 
After describing the implications for criminal justice of DNA in a 
broad sense, the article will consider a number of key precepts which 
may be affected by DNA collection and subsequent retention, namely 
the right to bodily integrity, the right of privacy and the presumption 
of innocence.   It will focus on how existing laws in a range of 
common law jurisdictions have sought to address these concerns.   
 
 
1 See Liz Campbell, ‘A rights-based analysis of DNA retention:  “Non-conviction” 
databases and the liberal state’ [2010] Crim.L.R. 889. 
2 See Liz Campbell and Nessa Lynch, ‘Competing paradigms? The use of DNA in 
youth justice in New Zealand and Scotland’, staff seminar, Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand, December 2010.    
3 The term “non-conviction” DNA retention is used throughout this piece as 
shorthand for storage of DNA which is not dependent on a criminal conviction and 
occurs regardless of the results of a criminal investigation or prosecution.   The only 
viable alternative term, “pre-conviction”, may suggest that a conviction does indeed 
follow, which is not the case. 
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Throughout, the extent to which these comparator countries have 
influenced each other, in terms of policy adoption or avoidance, will 
be noted.   Crime control measures in the United States often 
represent a prototype for other countries, in terms of the usual trend 
and direction of policy transfer.4   However, rather than the 
“American exceptionalism” so often cited in criminological literature,5 
until recently England and Wales has stood as somewhat of an 
anomaly in regards to DNA surveillance with the most expansive 
scheme of DNA retention for innocent persons in the common law 
world.   Notably, this is now to be amended.   The shared theme 
evident in the comparator jurisdictions is a shift to a risk-oriented 
model of DNA in criminal justice, although the Canadian approach 
appears most cognisant of the human rights implications of the 
expansion of DNA databases. 
 
II.   THE USE OF DNA IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
The genetic material in human DNA determines physical 
characteristics and traits, genetic disorders, susceptibility to disease 
and ethnic origin.   An individual’s DNA is unique (except in the case 
of identical twins) and is inherited from both one’s parents.   As more 
similarities may be seen in the DNA of siblings and family members 
when compared with unrelated persons, DNA may reveal familial 
relationships.   Thus, a DNA sample contains a range of intimate 
personal and family information.   In contrast, a DNA profile, 
generated from a sample, is a code comprising a set of identifying 
characteristics from regions of DNA that are not known to provide 
for any physical characteristics or medical conditions of the person.   
A DNA profile consists of a list of numbers based on specific areas 
of DNA known as short tandem repeats and a gender indicator, and 
thus may only be read and interpreted with the aid of technology.6   
While profiles are computerised, they still contain “substantial 
amounts of unique personal data”,7 including information about 
familial relationships and ethnic origin.    
 
 
4 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, ‘Learning from Uncle Sam? Understanding US 
Influences over UK Crime Control Policy’ (2002) 15(1) Governance 97;  Tim 
Newburn, ‘Atlantic crossings:  “Policy transfer” and crime control in the USA and 
Britain’ (2002) 4 Punishment and Society 165. 
5 See for example Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice:  
Exploring US Influence over British Crime Control Policy (Open University Press 2007), 5. 
6 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Postnote:  The National DNA 
Database, Number 258 (2006) <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/ 
postpn258.pdf> accessed May 2, 2011. 
7 S. v. U.K., 48 E.H.R.R. 1169 (Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights), [73]-[76]. 
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Many misconceptions exist about DNA evidence, insofar as it is 
often viewed as infallible and beyond question.   However, as with 
other forms of physical evidence, the potential for false positives 
exists.   The profiling system used in the United Kingdom uses ten 
regions of DNA whereas a previous system used six;  in Australia 
nine loci are used;  in the United States and Canada 13 are used and in 
New Zealand 15.8   Thus, an “adventitious match” could occur 
between two DNA profiles, and this becomes more likely the fewer 
loci are used;  although it has been argued that further testing of 
additional DNA loci would distinguish between two such individuals’ 
DNA, except in the case of identical twins.9   Moreover, 
contamination could occur at the time the swab was taken, or during 
comparison in the laboratory.   Furthermore, human error in storage, 
processing or interpretation is always possible, as in the context of 
other evidence.   It is also conceivable for a positive match to be 
found between crime scene material and a suspect’s DNA without 
necessarily implying criminal culpability, either by virtue of innocent 
presence at a particular location or through the “planting” of 
evidence.   Finally, despite popular media portrayal, not all crime 
scenes are swabbed for genetic material due to logistical, practical or 
financial reasons, and so comparison with database profiles is not 
always part of an investigation. 
 
III.   DNA DATABASES 
Despite points of commonality, and evidence of a degree of 
convergence, some notable differences persist between current laws 
on non-conviction DNA databases in a range of common law 
countries.   England and Wales may be characterised as occupying 
one end of the spectrum insofar as its policies until 2011 were the 
most permissive, while Canada maintains the most restrictive laws.    
The United Kingdom’s National DNA Database (NDNAD) was 
set up in 1995 and contains genetic material gathered from all over 
 
 
8 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (n.6), 1;  New South Wales Centre 
for Genetics Education, ‘Fact Sheet 22:  DNA Genetic Testing – Paternity and 
Forensic Use’ <http://www.genetics.com.au/factsheet/fs22.asp#para_2> accessed 
May 2, 2011;;  Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System’ 
<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet> accessed May 
2, 2011;  Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, House of 
Commons Canada, Statutory Review of the DNA Identification Act, June 2009 (40th 
Parliament, 2nd Session), 2;  Institute of Environmental Science and Research, A brief 
history of Forensic DNA 1990-2010 <http://www.esr.cri.nz/SiteCollectionDocuments/ 
ESR/PDF/ForensicScience/Forensic20yearsDNA.pdf> accessed May 2, 2011. 
9 National DNA Database Strategy Board, National DNA Database Annual Report 
2007-09 (NOIA 2009), 42. 
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the UK.   Proportionately speaking the NDNAD is the largest of its 
kind in the world and contained 7.39 per cent of the UK population 
in 2009,10 while the most recent figures indicate almost nine per cent 
coverage.11   Second chronologically only to the United Kingdom, a 
DNA database was established in New Zealand in 1995, and this was 
followed at federal level in the United States with establishment of 
the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the National DNA 
Index System (NDIS) in 1998.12   Canada’s National DNA Data Bank 
has been in place since 2000,13 and the National Criminal 
Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD) was constructed in Australia 
in 2001.14   Though the value of DNA in criminal investigations is not 
disputed, policies relating to the parameters of these databases and 
the duration of DNA storage are in flux. 
 
IV.   THE COLLECTION OF DNA 
While collection of genetic material on the one hand and retention on 
the other overlap in respect of their consequences they raise slightly 
different issues.   Collecting DNA from an individual encroaches on 
his right to physical integrity,15 by virtue of the seizure of his bodily 
material through an invasive procedure, and given that force may be 
used to obtain the sample if consent is not forthcoming.16   The 
degree of intrusion on the right to physical integrity, as protected 
through provisions relating to privacy or prohibiting unreasonable 
 
 
10 Constitution Committee, Surveillance:  Citizens and the State (HL 2008-09, 18-I), para. 180. 
11 National Policing Improvement Agency, ‘National DNA Database – Statistics’ 
<http://www.npia.police.uk/en/13338.htm> accessed May 2, 2011. 
12 Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.8). 
13 DNA Identification Act 1998, amending the Criminal Code of Canada.   See Sylvain 
Lalonde, ‘Canada’s National DNA Data Bank:  A Success Story’ (2006) 39 Canadian 
Society of Forensic Science Journal 1. 
14 See David Whiley and Barbara Hocking, ‘DNA:  Crime, Law and Public Policy’ 
[2003] University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 4;  (2003) 5 University of 
Notre Dame Australia Law Review 37;;  Jeremy Gans and Gregor Urbas, ‘DNA 
Identification in the Criminal Justice  System’, in Trends and Issues in Crime and  
Criminal Justice (Australian Institute of Criminology 2002) No. 226;  Simon Walsh, 
Oliver Ribaux, John Buckleton, Alastair Ross and Claude Roux, ‘DNA profiling  
and criminal justice:  a contribution to a changing debate’ (2004) 36 Australian 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 34. 
15 Though the privilege against self-incrimination may appear relevant in this context, 
case law has excluded tangible evidence decisively from its scope:  Saunders v. U.K., 23 
E.H.R.R. 313, [69] (European Court of Human Rights);  Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966), 761;  R. v. S.A.B. [2003] SCC 60, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678.   See Jeremy 
Gans, ‘Something to Hide:  DNA, surveillance and self-incrimination’ (2001) Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice 168. 
16 See text accompanying n.42, post. 
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searches,17 is affected by the stage at which sampling occurs, the 
threshold for the offence and the means of sampling.   Key 
differences exist between common law countries in terms of the 
populations from whom DNA samples may be taken, ranging from 
anyone arrested, through persons arrested for certain offences of a 
minimum gravity, or after the issue of a warrant in specific instances.   
In addition, the method by which DNA is collected, that is whether 
through a blood sample or buccal swab, may also determine the 
impact on human rights. 
 
A.   The population of the databases 
In the United Kingdom, the United States and now New Zealand, the 
police may collect DNA without judicial approval from a wide range 
of suspects.   In England, Wales and Northern Ireland a DNA sample 
may be taken from any individual arrested for or informed that he 
will be reported for a recordable offence,18 whether or not he is 
detained in a police station or in police custody.19   The equivalent 
Scottish measures are slightly narrower:  a bodily sample may be 
collected from a person detained or arrested for an offence 
punishable by imprisonment.20   Since the enactment of the DNA 
Fingerprinting Act of 2005,21 DNA sample collection has been required 
by United States’ agencies “from individuals who are arrested or from 
non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of 
the United States”.22   In addition, a sizeable minority of American 
states now have laws authorising arrestee DNA sampling, although 
this pertains to felonies or offences punishable by a minimum period 
of imprisonment only.23   The Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) 
 
 
17 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8;  Fourth Amendment to the US 
Constitution;  Canadian Charter of Rights, ss.7 and 8;  and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, s.21. 
18 A recordable offence is one which carries the possibility of a custodial sentence as 
well as other, non-imprisonable offences in the schedule to the National Police Records 
(Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000 (S.I. 2000 No. 1139). 
19 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989 No. 1341), as amended by the Criminal Justice and Police 
Act 2001 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
20 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s.18.   For further analysis of the Scottish 
scheme, see Paul Johnson and Robin Williams, ‘DNA and Criminal Investigation:  
Scotland and the “UK National DNA Database”’ (2004) Scottish Journal of Criminal 
Justice Studies 10;;  and Liz Campbell, ‘DNA Databases and Innocent Persons:  
Lessons From Scotland?’ (2010) 4 Juridical Review 285. 
21 Passed as Title X of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act 2005, Public Law 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960. 
22 ibid., 3085 (s.1004(a)(1)). 
23 Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont and Virginia have laws authorising arrestee DNA sampling.   See the 
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Amendment Act 2009 in New Zealand changes the time at which the 
person’s DNA can be acquired compulsorily to arrest (rather than 
after conviction as was previously the case), it removes the need for 
judicial authorisation before the taking of a sample, and lowers the 
offence threshold considerably.   Once the 2009 Act is implemented 
fully, police will be able to collect DNA from persons suspected of 
having committed an imprisonable offence or another offence listed 
in the Act’s schedule (such as assault, receiving stolen goods, or 
peeping into a dwelling).24 
This outline indicates that many common law countries are 
increasing gradually the scope and populations of DNA databases, by 
permitting collection at arrest or charge, rather than it being 
predicated on conviction as was once the case.   Moreover, judicial 
approval is not required in the United Kingdom, United States or 
New Zealand.   However Canada and Australia differ somewhat from 
the other comparator jurisdictions, in limiting collection to indictable 
offences and in requiring a warrant for DNA collection in certain 
instances.   In Australia, the Crimes Act 1914 (as amended) permits the 
collection of a forensic sample from a person suspected of having 
committed an indictable offence, or charged with or summonsed to 
appear before a court in relation to an indictable offence.25   If the 
suspect is in custody, a senior constable may authorise non-intimate 
sampling, but a court order is required for intimate procedures.26   If 
the individual is not in custody sample collection must be based on a 
court order.   Furthermore, Canada has even more strongly resisted 
automatic non-conviction DNA collection and retention by police.   
Collection may occur only with a court warrant and in relation to a 
suspected indictable offence, if the best interests of the administration 
of justice necessitate a comparison between that person’s DNA and 
material found at a crime scene.27   Thus, while DNA testing and 
banking in Canada has been described as symptomatic of a trend in 
criminal justice away from an emphasis on individual rights towards 
increased state control,28 in fact Canada retains one of the more 
                                                                                                             
website of the National Conference of State Legislatures: 
<http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/CivilandCriminalJustice/StateLawsonDNA 
DataBanks/tabid/12737/Default.aspx> accessed May 2, 2011. 
24 Pt 2B, inserting s.24J into the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995. 
25 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Essentially Yours:  The Protection of Human 
Genetic Information in Australia [2003] A.L.R.C. 96.   See also David Ormerod and 
Andrew Roberts, ‘DNA sampling and database – Australia’ [2005] Crim.L.R. 330. 
26 S.23WC. 
27 S.487.05. 
28 Neil Gerlach, The Genetic Imaginary:  DNA in the Canadian Criminal Justice System 
(University of Toronto Press 2004) 219. 
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limited schemes,29 despite pressure from opposition political parties at 
the time the DNA Identification Act 1998 was being debated.30   In its 
2009 review of the relevant legislation, the Standing Committee on 
Public Safety and National Security recommended the automatic 
taking of a DNA sample upon conviction for all designated offences, 
but did not address systematic non-conviction DNA collection or 
retention.31   Indeed, the Canadian government is now proposing to 
expand the scheme by taking DNA from any individual charged with 
an indictable offence,32 demonstrating a possible shift to a model 
more akin to other common law jurisdictions. 
The compelling interest in DNA as a law enforcement tool and its 
importance in the detection of crime is stressed in many common law 
courts,33 although in S. v. United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights noted that most states allow such 
materials to be taken only from individuals suspected of having 
committed offences of a certain minimum gravity.34   This approach 
is particularly evident in the United States and in Canada, while in 
New Zealand, the range of offences is being extended.   The rationale 
for this is that the need to investigate more serious criminality 
warrants certain special measures, and conversely that bodily 
intrusions should not occur in relation to minor offences.   
Maintaining a threshold in this way so that DNA collection pertains 
to crimes of a certain gravity only limits the population of the 
database, and thus may be seen as proportionate.   However, it is not 
apparent that the more serious the suspected offence the more we 
should permit limitations on the individual’s rights pre-trial.35   Either 
a crime control tactic is permissible or not in a rights’ sense, and the 
apparent severity of the crime should not be of consequence. 
 
 
 
29 See Julianne Parfett, ‘Canada’s DNA Databank:  Public Safety and Private Costs’ 
(2002-2003) 29 Manitoba Law Journal 33.    
30 Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts:  What is Parliament’s Role? (McGill-Queen’s 
University Press 2002) 128. 
31 Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (n.8), 
Recommendation 3.    
32 Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), ‘CCLA Concerned about Potential 
Expansion of DNA Databank’ (May 14, 2010) <http://ccla.org/2010/05/14/ccla-
concerned-about-potential-expansion-of-dna-databank/> accessed May 2, 2011. 
33 U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc);  Anderson v. Virginia,  
650 S.E.2d 702 (Vir. 2006), 706;  U.S. v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (2009), 912;  
Haskell and Ento v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (2009). 
34 S. v. U.K. (n.7), [106]-[108]. 
35 Andrew Ashworth, Serious Crime, Human Rights and Criminal Procedure  
(Sweet and Maxwell 2002). 
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B.   The method of DNA collection 
In addition to the populations from whom DNA may be taken, the 
mechanism by which this occurs is also significant.   In the United 
Kingdom, DNA is taken by police by means of a buccal (mouth) 
swab which is classified as a non-intimate sample and does not 
require consent,36 in contrast to the characterisation in Australia of 
such a swab as intimate which must be taken by a medical practitioner 
or another “appropriately qualified” person.37   In Canada and the 
United States, DNA is generally collected by means of a blood 
sample, while in New Zealand a bodily sample means either a blood or a 
buccal sample, although most profiles on the databank come from 
buccal scrapes.38   In Schmerber v. California the United States Supreme 
Court emphasised that a compulsory blood test after arrest for 
driving while intoxicated was reasonable given the minimal extraction 
of blood, its effectiveness and widespread use, the virtual absence of 
risk or pain for most people, and its performance by a physician in a 
hospital environment.39   Despite the absence of a specific Supreme 
Court case in point, for the most part, a Fourth Amendment analysis 
using a general balancing test has been applied in state and federal 
courts to uphold the collection of DNA samples from persons 
arrested for violent felonies on the basis that it entails a minimal 
privacy intrusion, and because of the diminished expectation of 
privacy of arrestees when compared with the general population and 
the compelling interest in DNA as a law enforcement tool.40   
Similarly, in R. v. Rodgers the Supreme Court of Canada found that the 
taking of a DNA sample by blood involves a “minimal” “impact on 
the physical integrity of the targeted offenders”.41 
If the person refuses to consent to bodily sampling, reasonable 
force may be used,42 although in Canada any “necessary” force may 
be used to take the sample,43 and the blood sample need not be taken 
by a medical physician.   Walker and Cram have stated that “the 
prospect of force being used by the police to keep a suspect still and 
to hold his lips open whilst his mouth lining is scraped does seem to 
 
 
36 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.58;  Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, 
s.18(6A). 
37 Crimes Act 1914, s.23WA. 
38 Institute of Environmental Science and Research (n.8), 7. 
39 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 771. 
40 See n.33. 
41 R. v. Rodgers [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 (Supreme Court of Canada).   See Andrew Roberts, 
‘Case Comment:  DNA database – Canada’ [2006] Crim.L.R. 866.    
42 Crimes Act 1914, s.23XJ (Australia);  Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment 
Act 2009, s.48A (New Zealand);  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.117  
(England and Wales);  Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s.19B. 
43 Criminal Code of Canada, s.487.07. 
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be an extremely intrusive search”.44   However, the limited enduring 
effect on the individual and the usefulness for criminal investigation 
indicate scraping the side of someone’s mouth for DNA collection is 
justifiable, as is the taking of a blood sample, as long as it is 
predicated on reasonable suspicion which is judicially approved, as in 
the case of Canada, and as long as only reasonable force is used, as in 
the United Kingdom.   In this respect Redmayne’s view of Walker 
and Cram’s approach as unduly rigid seems persuasive, on the basis 
that it would lead to a loss of useful evidence and also that notions of 
bodily integrity and what constitutes acceptable investigative practice 
are not static.45   Indeed, in New Zealand, if consent to taking bodily 
material is not forthcoming and thus if force is needed to be used, a 
fingerprick blood sample must be taken rather than a buccal swab,46 
indicating some divergence in terms of political and legal perceptions 
of physical intrusions, given the legislative preference for the latter in 
non-consensual situations in the United Kingdom. 
The diminished expectation of privacy of arrestees when 
compared with the general population has been focused on in United 
States case law in particular in finding DNA collection to be 
constitutional.47   The rights of the arrested or accused person are 
affected through searches, seizures and detention, although pre-trial, 
the state must provide reasonable grounds for suspecting 
involvement in a particular crime before limiting such rights.   These 
accepted incursions are of comparable impact to the forcible scraping 
of the inside of the suspect’s mouth or the taking of a blood sample, 
which is and should be permissible as long as grounded upon 
reasonable suspicion.    
 
C.   Warrant requirements 
Many of the comparator jurisdictions permit DNA collection to be 
predicated on arrest and police discretion.   However, the warrant 
requirement in Canada for any DNA collection is preferable because 
of the express articulation of reasonable suspicion and judicial 
involvement.   Judicial approval of a warrant protects the DNA 
collection process from abuse, given the independent examination of 
police suspicions and reasoning which underpin the request for a 
bodily sample.   Limiting the power to authorise DNA collection to 
judges ensures that an adequate detachment is maintained between 
 
 
44 Ian G. Cram and Clive Walker, ‘D.N.A. profiling and police powers’  
[1990] Crim.L.R. 479, 486-7. 
45 Mike Redmayne, ‘The DNA database:  civil liberty and evidentiary issues’  
[1998] Crim.L.R. 437, 443. 
46 Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2009, s.48A. 
47 See n.33. 
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the investigating body and the appraiser of reasonable suspicion on 
which DNA collection is predicated. 
Arrest must be based on reasonable suspicion, that is, an 
“articulable and particularised belief that criminal activity is afoot”48 
which has “an objective basis … based on facts, information, and/ or 
intelligence” and “can never be supported on the basis of personal 
factors”.49   However, arrest practices by the police may be 
discriminatory or premised on incorrect information or unjustifiable 
concerns.50   Indeed, it was reported that in England and Wales 
“arrest for DNA sampling” has occurred,51 although this has been 
denied by the Association of Chief Police Officers.52   Regardless of 
the veracity of such claims, the interference involved in bodily 
sampling and the sensitivity of the data in DNA implies that 
collection should be strictly limited to cases where reasonable 
suspicion is established firmly in a court setting.   Though the impact 
of a mouth swab or blood test on bodily integrity seems 
proportionate to the aim of crime control, permitting this to occur 
systematically upon arrest rather than at charge is dubious.   Thus, as 
outlined, the Canadian approach in this context is preferable, given 
that express articulation of reasonable suspicion and judicial approval 
is required.   Indeed, in R. v. Briggs the Ontario Court of Appeal found 
that the “best interests of the administration of justice” standard 
which needs to be satisfied before DNA collection and comparison 
could occur was constitutional as it requires the court to consider and 
balance privacy interests against the societal aim of crime control.53 
In essence, it does not appear that there is robust normative 
opposition to the taking of DNA, as long as judicial approval is 
granted.   What appears more problematic in a rights’ sense is the 
effect of DNA retention on the right to privacy and on the 
presumption of innocence.    
 
 
 
48 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), 695. 
49 Home Office, Police And Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code A:  Code of Practice for the 
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V.   DNA RETENTION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The right to privacy is that most often cited in relation to DNA 
retention,54 given the exceptional nature of genetic material which 
determines physical characteristics and traits, genetic disorders, 
susceptibility to disease and ethnic origin.   While the storage and use 
of a DNA profile rather than a DNA sample may mitigate the impact 
on personal privacy, both forms affect the right to informational 
privacy, which is the right to retain control or at least oversight of 
data or material taken from or relating to oneself.   The effect of 
DNA retention on privacy has been judged partly by the categories of 
people whose DNA may be retained, the duration of retention and 
the form in which DNA is stored.   Keeping the genetic material of 
convicted persons has been approved by numerous common law 
courts,55 but the situation concerning unconvicted persons is less 
clear. 
 
A.   Duration of retention 
Until the Protection of Freedoms Bill 2011 is enacted, indefinite retention 
of DNA may occur in England, Wales and Northern Ireland after 
genetic material is collected upon arrest, regardless of whether the 
individual is charged or prosecuted or not.56   Such retention must 
have been for the purposes of the prevention and detection of crime;  
the investigation of an offence;  or the conduct of a prosecution.   
When challenged, the European Court of Human Rights found in  
S. v. United Kingdom that this “blanket and indiscriminate” retention of 
DNA violated the right to privacy and family life under Article 8 of 
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the European Convention on Human Rights,57 and thus a more 
restrictive model is currently being debated in the Protection of Freedoms 
Bill.   The bill, as it stands at the time of writing (May 2011), permits 
non-conviction DNA retention for three years in the case of arrest 
for certain serious offences.58   This may be extended for two years 
on application to a magistrates’ court, with an appeal against this 
decision being permitted to the Crown Court.59   Although material 
may be retained pending investigation or proceedings, it must be 
deleted after acquittal or discontinuance of proceedings for minor 
offences.60 
In contrast to the scheme impugned in S. v. United Kingdom, 
specific time frames are provided in Scotland, Australia and New 
Zealand, and will soon be in England and Wales.   Retention of 
genetic samples is permitted in Scotland only where there has been a 
prosecution, and only in relation to certain sexual or violent 
allegations,61 and this found favour in the European Court.62   In 
other words, retention is permitted if proceedings have been 
instituted rather than after arrest or charge, and this applies to a 
limited range of more serious offences.   Indefinite retention of DNA 
without conviction is not allowed per se;  according to the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 the destruction date is three years 
following the conclusion of proceedings and a sheriff may extend this 
for no more than two years,63 and nothing prevents recurring police 
applications to amend further this date.   In Australia, the material 
must be destroyed as soon as practicable after 12 months from the 
taking of the sample if proceedings have not been instituted or have 
been discontinued, or if the person has been acquitted and no appeal 
is lodged or the appeal is withdrawn, unless there is an outstanding 
arrest warrant for the person from whom the sample was taken.64   
Once such a warrant lapses the material must be destroyed, or if the 
person is apprehended destruction must occur within 12 months.65   
Furthermore, on application by a constable or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, a magistrate may extend retention for 12 months if 
there are special reasons for doing so, and such an extension may be 
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given more than once.66   In New Zealand, a sample must be 
destroyed as soon as practicable after a DNA profile is obtained from 
it, and records of analysis must be destroyed as soon as practicable 
within two months of taking the sample, if the person is not charged, 
if the charge is withdrawn or the person is acquitted.67   A district 
court judge may extend this on police application by increments of six 
months if good reason remains to suspect the person of committing a 
relevant offence or if retention of the samples and records is 
important to the investigation or to related criminal proceedings.68 
Under the Canadian Criminal Code, bodily substances taken under 
warrant will be destroyed “without delay” if a match is not found 
between the suspect’s DNA and the material from the crime scene or 
if the person is finally acquitted, or will be destroyed within a year if 
proceedings are discontinued.69   An exception may be made to this 
by order of a provincial court judge if the bodily substances or results 
might reasonably be required in an investigation or prosecution of the 
suspect or of someone else in relation to the suspected offence.70   In 
essence, the judge in this instance determines the appropriate 
retention period.   The Canadian government is now proposing to 
expand this scheme, to facilitate retention after an acquittal or failure 
to proceed with a charge.71   In the United States, the DNA 
Fingerprinting Act 2005 does not provide specific retention periods, but 
states that destruction occurs on receipt of a court order certifying 
that the charge has been dismissed or resulted in an acquittal, or that 
no charge was filed.72   Other than this, there are no rules relating to 
DNA retention at the United States federal level. 
Indefinite retention of DNA is problematic in terms of human 
rights;  the European Court of Human Rights held that “blanket and 
indiscriminate” retention of DNA in England and Wales violated the 
right to a private and family life,73 and favoured limiting non-
conviction retention to serious suspected offences.74   As noted 
above, DNA contains a range of intimate personal and family 
information, and thus retention engages and affects the right to 
privacy.   This is compounded by the fact that the original decision 
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about inclusion on the databases may be purely a police matter.   
While initially retention in Scotland is contingent on police 
judgment,75 the approval of a sheriff is required for extension of the 
time frame for unconvicted persons,76 and judicial approval will 
similarly be required in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.77   In 
Canada, a warrant is required before collection and a judge 
determines the retention period;  in Australia, retention beyond a year 
requires judicial approval, while in New Zealand a district court judge 
must order retention at six monthly intervals.   This judicial 
intervention is preferable to the police process in place in England 
and Wales until 2011, as it ensures proper judicial oversight and thus 
seeks to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusion into 
genetic privacy.   Indeed, central to the decision of the United States 
District Court in United States v. Pool in balancing the competing 
interests was the “judicial involvement” and grand jury determination 
of probable cause before DNA testing.78 
 
B.   Form of DNA storage 
Whether DNA is held as a sample or profile may also be relevant for 
privacy concerns.79   As previously detailed, a wider range of intimate 
genetic information may be gleaned from the former, while a DNA 
profile is a set of identifying characteristics from areas of DNA that 
do not reveal a person’s physical traits or medical conditions.   
Moreover, a DNA profile is held as a code which may only be read 
with the aid of technology.80   Of the comparator jurisdictions 
focused on here, until 2011 only New Zealand clearly distinguished 
between the two formats, and requires the destruction of a sample as 
soon as practicable after a DNA profile is obtained from it.81   Under 
the Protection of Freedoms Bill, England, Wales and Northern Ireland will 
require destruction of a DNA sample as soon as a DNA profile has 
been derived from the sample, or within six months, if this is 
sooner.82   Though these policies limit the amount of information 
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which may be obtained, the right to privacy is still affected by 
profiles’ retention, given the “substantial amounts of unique personal 
data” contained in them, including information about familial 
relationships and ethnic origin.83   In other words, storage as a profile 
may mitigate but not resolve completely concerns about privacy.    
 
VI.   DNA RETENTION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
A further right or interest which is affected by the retention of the 
DNA of unconvicted persons is the presumption of innocence.   
Non-conviction DNA databases embody the state’s suspicion of the 
risk of (re-)offending on the part of certain people, thereby 
distinguishing them from “truly” innocent people who have never 
come to the attention of the police.   In broad terms, this may 
compromise the precept that everyone should be presumed innocent, 
by keeping the DNA of legally innocent individuals on a database 
which is otherwise populated by convicted persons.   While the 
schemes in place in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Canada narrow the range of relevant unconvicted persons, this does 
not mitigate the effect on those who remain included in the database.    
In S. v. U.K., the applicants claimed that retention casts suspicion 
on unconvicted persons implying that they were not “wholly 
innocent”.84   While the European Court of Human Rights 
concurred, stating that unconvicted persons, who “are entitled to the 
presumption of innocence, are treated in the same way as convicted 
persons”,85 this factor underpinned its final judgment on the right to 
privacy rather than representing a discrete finding on the substantive 
point.   Similarly, little attention has been paid in the United States to 
the presumption of innocence per se in relation to DNA databases.   
In United States v. Pool, when dismissing the claim that DNA collection 
breaches procedural due process as protected by the Fifth 
Amendment, the District Court for the Eastern District of California 
noted that the DNA destruction procedures after exoneration or 
dismissal of charges ensure that “the risk of an innocent person’s 
DNA being included in CODIS [the US federal DNA database] is 
minimal”.86   However, in United States v. Mitchell the court granted the 
defendant’s motion opposing the collection of a pre-trial DNA 
sample,87 stressing the neglect in United States v. Pool of “the moral 
polestar of our criminal justice system – the presumption of 
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innocence”.88   However, this reference to the presumption, as in S. v. 
U.K., was inextricably bound up with the right to privacy, and 
concerned collection and the storage that follows rather than 
retention specifically.   In the United States, however, the 
presumption of innocence is simply a rule of evidence which allows 
the defendant to stand mute at trial and places the burden upon the 
state to prove the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt.89   
Thus, despite the instinctive feeling that DNA retention affects a 
person’s right to be presumed innocent, the presumption as legally 
construed is not in fact compromised in the United States.   The same 
holds true for New Zealand. 
In the United Kingdom, the maintenance of formalised suspicion 
in the form of DNA retention may pose problems in a rights’ sense, 
given that, unlike the situation in the United States, the presumption 
of innocence in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights extends beyond a strictly procedural guarantee to encompass a 
“reputational” aspect which aims to protect the image of the person.90   
As Trechsel notes, complex problems surround the application of this 
element of the presumption of innocence.91   Judicial decisions or 
reasoning reflecting an opinion that an acquitted person is guilty, such 
as requiring him to pay the costs of the proceedings or compensation 
or stating that had a prosecution not been time-barred it would “very 
probably have led to … conviction”, breach this aspect of Article 
6(2).92   Moreover, where a court expresses suspicion about an 
acquitted individual (rather than opining that he is guilty), such as by 
refusing compensation to him or by saying that suspicion has not 
been “dispelled”, the presumption will also have been infringed.93   
However, “[t]he voicing of suspicions regarding an accused’s 
innocence is conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal 
proceedings has not resulted in a decision on the merits of the 
accusation.”94   In other words, where criminal proceedings are 
discontinued, statements which describe a state of suspicion, as 
opposed to those which constitute a determination of guilt, are 
compatible with the presumption of innocence.95   Non-conviction 
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DNA retention is not an expression of guilt but arguably denotes 
suspicion on the part of the state as to the future criminality of the 
person and his likelihood of re-offending;  in S. v. U.K., the Grand 
Chamber stated that “the retention of the applicants’ private data 
cannot be equated with the voicing of suspicions”.96   While this 
distinction is not explained or explored by the court, one can 
speculate that it is the absence of express articulation and 
dissemination of the fact of DNA retention which differentiates it 
from the voicing of suspicion.   One could respond that DNA 
retention is on a continuum from the latter as it represents the state’s 
opinion about criminal tendencies on the part of the charged or 
acquitted person.   If such an analogy is accepted and, despite the 
comment of the Grand Chamber, state storage of DNA is conceived 
of as representing a type of expression of suspicion, then the 
presumption of innocence in its reputational sense may be threatened. 
In Canada, DNA profiles derived from bodily substances obtained 
from a suspect under warrant are not included in the national DNA 
data bank and are used only in the investigation and prosecution of a 
designated offence.97   In other words, speculative searching is not 
permitted.   This contrasts to the situation in the other comparator 
jurisdictions where the DNA of unconvicted and convicted persons is 
stored in the same repository and subject to the same searching 
mechanism.   In the United States, the DNA database is subdivided 
into a Forensic Index of profiles deriving from crime scene samples, 
and an Offender and Arrestee Index;98   New Zealand has two 
separate databases, the Crime Sample Database and the National 
DNA Database which contains profiles of individuals whether 
convicted or not,99 while the Australian NCIDD and the United 
Kingdom’s NDNAD similarly contain both unconvicted and 
convicted parties’ DNA.   The Canadian approach is a model of best 
practice by differentiating between the samples from convicted and 
arrested individuals, and by precluding exploratory comparisons of 
crime scene and stored samples.   This distinction mitigates the 
potentially stigmatising effect of DNA retention and safeguards the 
presumption of innocence as protected by section 11(d) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
An analogy may be drawn between DNA retention and pre-trial 
detention after the refusal of bail which also appears to equate an 
individual with convicted persons.   Bail may be refused if there is, 
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inter alia, convincing evidence that pre-trial release could not assure 
the safety of any other person and the community, or to prevent the 
commission of an offence.100   Indeed, Laudan notes that bail 
hearings cannot be squared with a broad construal of the 
presumption of innocence:101  thus if refusal of bail is permissible 
surely the less invasive retention of DNA must be too.   Restrictions 
on the refusal of bail indicate what is appropriate in the context of 
DNA retention, given that in both instances the rights of an 
individual who is legally innocent are restricted by virtue of a possible 
risk of criminality.   “Clear and convincing evidence”102 or “strong 
and specific reasons” are required for restraining the defendant’s 
liberty103 on account of his presumed innocence and the rule of 
respect for individual liberty:104  in other words, each bail case is 
examined on its merits unlike the “blanket” retention of DNA which 
could, until at least 2011, occur without conviction in England and 
Wales.   Conversely, in contrast to pre-trial detention, and as the 
United Kingdom government emphasised in S. v. United Kingdom, 
there appears to be no practical consequence of retention for the 
relevant individual unless his DNA later matches a crime-scene 
profile.105   Certainly, the impact on an individual’s rights as a result of 
DNA retention is more remote and undoubtedly of less immediate 
effect than the refusal of bail, but the incursion into personal 
freedoms that it entails is no less real.   Storing DNA means state 
retention of unique personal data which may also reveal information 
about familial and genetic relationships and ethnic origin.106   While 
the retention of DNA does not compromise liberty in the physical 
sense, a similarly cautious approach should be adopted when 
considering whether DNA should be stored after acquittal, or when 
no action at all is taken, given the potential use of DNA and the level 
of personal information contained within it.   Moreover, bail refusal 
by definition ends on acquittal or the dropping of charges, whereas 
DNA retention may not.   Given that the refusal of bail follows a 
court decision, judicial intervention should similarly be required for 
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the retention of a DNA sample, as occurs in Canada and after a 
prescribed time frame in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.    
 
VII.   POLICY TRANSFER 
Incremental developments relating to non-conviction DNA databases 
across common law states may imply a convergence of laws and 
policies.   While it is questionable whether these changes may be 
characterised as involving policy transfer as such, which would 
require purposeful imitative activity, certainly there is evidence of 
policy spread which involves societies becoming more alike purely by 
the successive adoption of specific policy approaches.107   United 
States state agencies and projects108 and periodical police literature109 
on DNA databases cite the “U.K. [sic] experience” approvingly, while 
academic commentary reviews critically the English approach.110   
Nevertheless, an exploration of United States Senate and local 
debates indicates little evidence in political discourse or legislative 
debate of conscious or explicit emulation of other jurisdictions’ 
experiences or policies.   Caution was sounded in New Zealand 
during the third reading of the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) 
Amendment Bill about the “British” approach,111 while in the academic 
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setting it has been argued that Australia is likely to follow English 
expansionism.112   Conversely, discourse in Scotland emphasises 
resoundingly the differences between its scheme and that in place in 
England until 2011.113  
Policy convergence in the context of non-conviction DNA 
databases is evident when countries resolve in a comparable way the 
competing demands of crime control and human rights.   Indeed, the 
dominant narrative on non-conviction DNA databases has become 
one of risk rather than focusing on the appropriate level of state 
intervention in a liberal democracy, and this explains political support 
for the development and provides impetus for further expansion.114   
While risk has always been of concern in criminal justice, now the 
political and popular preference is for risk control which aims to 
prevent the recurrence of a new crime and to eliminate risk 
completely, rather than management or reduction which accepts the 
inevitability of error.115 
In England and Wales, risk was to the fore in justifying the 
continued existence of the non-conviction DNA database.   S. v. 
United Kingdom prompted a lengthy consultation process by the Home 
Office, ostensibly “to provide a proportionate balance between 
protecting communities and protecting the rights of the individual”116 
though the lack of a rights-focus in the resulting paper, “Keeping the 
right people on the database:  Science and public protection”, is 
noticeable.   The Home Office stressed that any change to the 
existing policy would “reduce the number of detections that DNA 
delivers, and will therefore have some adverse impact on public 
protection” and thus it aimed “to minimise this risk while complying 
with the … ruling” of the court.117   This was an explicit 
acknowledgment that the Home Office sought to maintain as lengthy 
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a retention period as would be permissible under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and the definite emphasis in the 
consultation document is on risk rather than rights’ analysis:  “In 
determining the most suitable retention period, the key question is 
one of risk”.118    Similarly, empirical studies on so-called 
“preventable crimes” have been relied upon in policy development in 
the United States and are often cited at federal and state level, 
indicating the growing centrality of risk in both discourse and 
practice.119   Such reference to science in criminal justice appeals to 
politicians who prefer the expertise of technical scientists who are 
seen as objective and non-ideological, in contrast to the “softer”, and 
by implication ideologically driven, expertise of human right lawyers, 
criminologists, psychologists and political scientists, who are 
neglected increasingly in the policy making process.   The use of 
science in criminal justice is ostensibly “universal, general, uniform, 
and neutral”120 and fits with the distrust of professionals, 
criminologists, officials, and practitioners identified by Rock in the 
Home Office the mid-1990s121 and the pervasive fall of “liberal 
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may09.pdf> accessed May 2, 2011. 
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elitism” in the governance of crime.122   Thus, while collection and 
retention of DNA encroaches on civil liberties, policy makers may 
couch the debate in terms of empirical validity to ensure the 
palatability of such policies.   Nevertheless, the discourse of risk has 
yet to result in systematic retention of DNA from non-convicted 
persons in Canada, but it has contributed to the extension of schemes 
in Australia and New Zealand. 
 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
This analysis demonstrates the points of commonality that are 
emerging in the context of non-conviction DNA databases in various 
common law countries, though divergence remains regarding the 
populations from whom DNA may be acquired and the length of 
time for which DNA may be retained.   Underpinning this is a shift to 
a risk-based approach, although Canada seems to have withstood 
such pressures to a larger extent.   As the Canadian Supreme Court 
has commented, “The taking and retention of a DNA sample is not a 
trivial matter and, absent a compelling public interest, would 
inherently constitute a grave intrusion on the subject’s right to 
personal and informational privacy.”123   In addition, inclusion on a 
state database is stigmatising and represents an expression of 
suspicion by the state.   Thus, the schemes in place should be limited 
to the greatest extent in terms of the populations included and the 
retention periods, and should require judicial warrant:  to this end, 
notwithstanding the ability to use all necessary force to obtain 
samples, the Canadian federal model seems preferable. 
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